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An anthropic principle has made it possible to answer the difficult question of why the observable
value of cosmological constant (Λ ∼ 10−47 GeV4) is so disconcertingly tiny compared to predicted
value of vacuum energy density ρSUSY ∼ 10
12 GeV4. Unfortunately, there is a darker side to this
argument; being combined with the cosmic heat death scenario, it consequently leads to another
absurd prediction: the probability of randomly selected observer observing Λ = 0 ends up being
exactly equal to 1. We’ll call this controversy an infrared divergence problem. It is shown that
the IRD prediction can be avoided with the help of a singular runaway measure coupled with the
calculation of relative Bayesian probabilities by the means of the doomsday argument. Moreover, it
is shown that while the IRD problem occurs for the prediction stage of value of Λ, it disappears at
the explanatory stage when Λ has already been measured by the observer.
PACS numbers:
I. INTRODUCTION
Among the challenges the physics is facing nowadays,
the problem of vacuum energy, a.k.a. the cosmological
constant’s problem is probably most troublesome of all.
It’s initial advent was heralded by an incomprehensibly
huge discrepancy (by no less then 50 orders of
magnitudes) between the predicted and observable value
of cosmological constant. The furthest investigations has
aggravated this already most grievous observation by
adding to it a problem of fine tuning in early universe.
To put it simply, the sheer magnitude of the currently
observable value of ρvac implies that for some unknown
reason the vacuum energy density in the early universe
had to be equal to the characteristic value of ρGUT
(the change in the vacuum energy induced by a phase
transition of a GUT scale) and, what is worse, the
equality had to hold with an unbelievable accuracy of up
to 10−107 – unbelievable even more since we are talking
about two distinct and (as far as we know) entirely
unrelated quantities.
There were many attempts to amend the described
situation, including the explanations, based on the
alternative cosmological models, such as brane world
models and the cosmologies with the variable speeds of
light [1], [2]. In the case of classical cosmology, however,
the honor of explanation is widely relegated to the
anthropic principle. In the well-known article [3] it has
been shown that the upper boundary for the effective
cosmological constant is
Λmax < 5000Λ0,
where Λ0 – is an observable value. The higher values
effectively prevents the observable large-scale structure
from formation, and, therefore, lead to cosmologies
completely devoid of life as we know it. In view of this, the
aforementioned fact of fine tuning in observable universe
stops being mysterious at last.
The last important step in the development of
the applicable anthropic reasoning was inclusion of
selection rules such as a self-sampling assumption or
mediocricity principle. It is important to note, that
acceptance of any of those hypothesis, firmly grounded
on statistical approach, explicitly implies the existence of
a multiverse, that serves a role of a statistical ensemble.
By accepting them, we are opening a road to estimating
the probabilities of observing any given event j. Such a
probability is factorizable as (cf. [4]):
Pj ∼ P¯jfj , (1.1)
where P¯j is the concentration of j-type bubbles and fj
is the anthropic factor proportional to a total amount of
observers residing inside the j-type bubble.
Remark 1. It should be pointed out that although this
factorization serves as a very good approximation for
many choices of cosmological measure (e.g., for the causal
patch measure), there are some measures that dictates
certain changes to formula. For example, the geometric
cutoff measure require not fj, but fj(t), with t denoting
the time of the bubble nucleation.
Of course, in order for (1.1) to make sense we have to
devise a way to count down the observers. In what follows
we’ll use the idea that the existence of observers has to be
equivalent to the generation of entropy production. This
idea in turn follows from the fact that every observation
should increase the entropy of the system and that
in average the total amount of observations would be
2proportional to the amount of matter’s entropy produced
in the volume under consideration. This idea has already
been successfully approbated in [5] to calculate the
expected average value of cosmological constant in the
observable universe.
However, despite the successes, the cosmologists has
recently gotten strong indications that not everything
is as simple and clear with anthropic reasoning as
they believed it was. In an ironic twist, the anthropic
reasoning, while solving the aforementioned problem,
seems to create yet another one. In fact, it predicts the
probability Pj to find oneself in a region with nonzero Λ
to be exactly zero. This stunning result is based on a fact
that the fraction of observations fj made in universes
with Λ 6= 0 has a zero measure due to heat death
befalling such universes and all their inhabitants [4]. In
other words, the anthropic reasoning asserts that with
100% certainty we have to be in a universe with Λ = 0.
[58] This discrepancy we’ll call an infrared catastrophe
or infrared divergence of cosmological measure. Another
surprise has revealed itself in the article [6], in which the
probabilities P¯j were proved to be equally zero for models
with Λ > 0 and nonzero for the ones with Λ ≤ 0. These
unforseen discoveries gave some authors the reasons
to claim either limited applicability or even complete
inadequacy of anthropic reasoning. The main purpose of
this article is to provide the counterarguments to such a
point of view. We will show that the zero probabilities
doesn’t necessarily pose a threat to validity of anthropic
reasonings, although they can certainly be of use for
the task of determining the limitations of the method.
Our proof will be based on analysis of prediction and
explanation as two distinct types of anthropic reasoning,
made in article of Garriga and Vilenkin [7]; we’ll show in
particular that the arguments of Garriga and Vilenkin
holds true even for those cases when the predicted
probabilities turn to zero.
On the other hand, some might argue that the
remedy is not much better then the illness itself, as the
prospect of reduction befalling the status of the anthropic
principle from being the one predicting things to a
mere explanatory argument truly cannot be called very
promising. We’ll show that this problem might actually
be amended by utilizing a different rule for counting
the probabilities, namely the one used in formulating
the Doomsday argument [59]. The change in the rule
might be attributed to indexical information pertaining
to the observer and required for successful calculations
regarding his/her own existence [7], [8].
Here is the main plan of the article. The second
chapter will be devoted to reviewing the results leading
to an infrared divergence of cosmological measure.
In the next chapter these results will be shown to
lead to no antimony, provided one use the anthropic
reasoning to explain the obtained value of Λ instead
of predicting it. In the fourth chapter we will show
that incorporation of Doomsday argument into the
calculations of Bayesian probabilities effectively disposes
of the infrared divergence, leaving the objections against
the anthropic reasoning ungrounded and thus rectifying
the problem spotted by [4]. The a priori distribution
used therein is an exponential runaway measure (singular
weighting function) recently studied by Linde and
Vanchurin in [9]. The final chapter contain the final
remarks and the conclusion.
II. AN INFRARED DIVERGENCE: THE CORE
OF A PROBLEM
An advent of infrared divergence was inevitable after
it was realized (cf. [10]) that the regions with Λ = 0
are open FRW universes, with unbounded entropy and
lifetime and thus containing a maximal – infinite, as a
matter of fact, – amount of observers. Below we’ll list the
most important numerical estimates made in [5], [11].
The probability PΛ to find oneself in a universe with a
given value of vacuum energy can be determined via
PΛ ∼ N(Λ)P¯ (Λ), (2.1)
where P¯ (Λ) is an a priori probabilities distribution (the
relative abundance of different values of Λ associated with
the different types of bubbles in the multiverse), and
N(Λ) is an anthropic factor proportional to the total
number of observers in a given region of a Multiverse.
The aforementioned number is evidently related to the
star formation rate, which can in turn be estimated from
the astrophysical data (cf. for example [12]), resulting in:
N(Λ) ∼
∫ tc
0
n˙(t)Vc(t)dt, (2.2)
where n˙(t) is the star formation rate in a comoving
volume Vc and tc defines a time of collapse. Obviously,
for those universes whose expansion has a de Sitter-type
asymptote tc =∞.
The behaviour of n˙(t) depends on the particular model
of star formation [13],[14],[15]. However, interestingly
enough, the difference is not essential, since all of them
predicts n˙(t) reaching a maximum after a couple of
billions of years and then suffering a relatively fast
decrease. Of course, the height and the width of the
maximum depend on the cosmological constant.
If the universe has a zero curvature and the radiation is
small enough, the Friedman equations become integrable
and the scale factor appears to have a following time
dependence:
a(t) = At
2/3
Λ sinh
2/3(3t/2tΛ),
where tΛ =
√
3/Λ, and A – a constant of integration. The
vacuum energy’s influence dominates over the dynamics
from tΛ. For t > tΛ the expansion rate can be correctly
approximated as:
a(t) ∼ t
2/3
Λ exp(t/tΛ).
3For t≪ tΛ the scale factor changes according to a power
law
a(t) ∼ t2/3.
The next step will be the determination of a measure
suitable for calculating the comoving volume Vc. In this
chapter we’ll use as example the causal patch cut off:
the measure that is defined as an ensemble of points
lying inside of a light cone in the past of a point on
the future boundary of spacetime, rather popular among
the cosmologists and, most importantly, consistent with
formula (1.1) (cf. Remark 1).
Such a choice for t > tΛ will result with high accuracy
in
Vc(t) =
4π
3
(∫
∞
t
dt
a(t)
)3
∼ tΛ exp(−3t/tΛ).
When Λ → 0 Vc(t) diverges. For t < tΛ it is possible to
write the expression for Vc with accuracy up to the linear
terms of t:
Vc(t) ∼
(
C − 3t1/3
)3
,
where C is a constant, appropriate choice of which should
allow for continuity of Vc together with its first derivative
at Vc. The integral, appearing in (2.2) can be broken into
two integrals over the intervals 0 < t < tΛ and t > tΛ
consequently. The second integral always converges as it
contains an exponentially decreasing function Vc(t).
The anthropic factor is inversely related to the
cosmological constant. The resulting P (Λ) will be
determined by the previously chosen function P¯ (Λ). If the
probability P¯ (Λ) increases proportionally to Λ (at least
for those Λ that are anthropically acceptable) then at
certain Λ0 the probability to find oneself in the universe
with a given value of vacuum energy would be maximal.
It is possible to convey similar analysis for negative
Λ’s. The problem arises, however, when we include in our
considerations the zero value of cosmological constant. In
this case the casual patch volume Vc → ∞ regardless of
t. As a result, the anthropic factor N(0) → ∞, and we
have to conclude that our universe with necessity should
have had Λ = 0! [60]
This problematic result can be aggravated further by
noting that any universe with a positive cosmological
constant eventually turns into a dS universe. When
the temperature drops to TdS ∼ Λ
−1/2 the entropy
production ceases to be and the universe enters into what
was quite aptly called a cosmic heat death [4]. In other
words, a dS universe can only contain a finite number of
observers per unit volume, which is quite different from
a universe with a zero cosmological constant. Since the
functions fj in (1.1) are nothing but relative fractions of
all possible observations, performed in every nook and
corner of the multiverse, it immediately follows that the
anthropic factor attributed to a universes with Λ > 0 is
fj = 0.
Remark 2. The aforementioned reasoning is somewhat
different from the one made in [4]. In fact, their
arguments were based on the Copernican Time Principle
[16], an assumption that all moments of time in the
past, present, and future of our universe should enter
our considerations on equal terms. The one adopting
the Principle is immediately rewarded by applicability of
a self-sampling assumption for all the four-dimensional
volume [61]. Now, recalling that the dS universe is itself
eternal while the time period in which it can sustain life
is finite, it is natural to conclude that probability to find
oneself in such a universe is equally zero.
The problem we have stumbled upon leads us to a
following question.
It is a prediction of the eternal inflation model that
there exist a cosmological multiverse, containing infinite
number of copies of every possible observer. What can be
said about probabilities of a event in such a multiverse?
Suppose we are conducting an experiment with two
possible outcomes A and B. The probabilities for those
outcomes are connected by formula
PA
PB
=
NA
NB
,
where NA,B is the amount of A and B outcomes in all the
multiverse. The direct calculation of probabilities then
becomes an insurmountable task as NA,B →∞.
Getting over this difficulty requires a procedure for
elimination of infinities, i.e. a suitable measure. Some
possible candidates have been proposed so far [17]-[27].
For the purpose of illustration let us consider a toy
landscape with two types of universes differing by their
cosmological constant.
The total number of events has a form:
NA,B = N1
∫ tmax
0
ρ(1)(t)A,BVc1(t)dt+
+N2
∫ tmax
0
ρ(2)(t)A,BVc2(t)dt,
(2.3)
where ρ(1,2)(t)A,B is the number of A (B) events per four-
dimensional unit volume of universe 1 (2). Ratio P1,2 =
N1,2/(N1+N2) defines the relative abundance of universe
1 or universe 2 in the theory landscape.
In case of a universe with Λ 6= 0 the comoving volume
Vc converges to a finite value thus getting rid of infinities.
The integrals in (2.3) ends up being finite and
PA
PB
=
P1n
(1)
A + P2n
(2)
A
P1n
(1)
B + P2n
(2)
A
,
where n1,2A,B is the number of events in the single vacuum
(single universe). From here it becomes obvious that in
case of Λ = 0 (the therminal vacuum) these numbers all
go to infinity dealing a crushing blow to our calculational
endeavour.
In the arguments above we have introduced an a priori
probability distribution P¯Λ, a fraction of universes with
a particular value of a cosmological constant. However,
4a somewhat different approach has been put forward
in [7]. According to it, one has instead to utilize an a
priori probability distribution PVc(Λ), characterizing a
fraction of (comoving) volume occupied by regions with
a given value of Λ. The merit of this approach is that
it entirely waives the difficulties with zero cosmological
problem. The equivalence of two approaches for Λ 6= 0
is indisputable and requires no additional comments. As
for the case Λ = 0, a simple assumption P¯ (Λ) 6= 0 makes
sure that a fraction of comoving volume, occupied by
universes with zero Λ is equal to 1, since a comoving
volume for even one such universe is infinitely large. Vice
versa, if 0 < PVc(0) < 1, then P¯ (0) = 0. It is interesting
to note, that the case P¯ (Λ) ∼ Λ considered in [11] leads
to similar results.
It was an infrared divergence resulting in f = 0 that
we have been discussing so far. However, the recent work
of Ellis and Smolin [6] provides us with arguments that
the positive values of Λ might as well correspond to a
zero value of a first multiple in (1.1).
To make it clear, one need to take into account that
the landscape consists of an infinite set of discrete vacua,
which are nothing but different possible (metastable)
ground states of string theory. It was shown in [28] that
these vacua include N+ ∼ 10
500 flux compactifications
which appear compatible with (3 + 1) noncompact
dimensions and a positive cosmological constant. On the
other hand, estimation of the number of allowed vacua
with a negative cosmological constant anthropically
results in N− = ∞ [29], [30]. Using the weak anthropic
principle, one get rather a discouraging outcome: the
relative probability for an observer to find him/herself in
a universe filled with a positive cosmological constant is
zero. More precisely, for a given anthropic limit Λ+ > 0
and for any positive ǫ ≪ Λ+ we have the probability
P (Λ > ǫ) = 0 [6]. This is true because there should be
infinitely more universes with negative Λ than universes
with strictly positive cosmological terms.
However, it should be remembered that a unverse
with negative Λ inevitably reaches a contraction
phase that ends up in a final singularity. The total
amount of possible observations in such a universe is
necessarily bounded and as such can’t compare with the
numbers, reached in the unverse with nonexistent (zero)
cosmological constant. After the dust settled we are still
one-on-one with the infrared divergence problem.
III. EXPLANATION VS. PREDICTION
The challenge of the infrared divergence did not not
remain unanswered. The possible solutions, provided by
different authors, can be arranged into the following
groups:
(1) There exists a physical principle, unknown as yet,
imposing the bounds on the function P¯Λ, so that P¯ = 0
when Λ = 0. For example, it might be that the vacua of
nonpositive energy density simply doesn’t exist.
Unfortunately, it can’t be true: as follows from the
analysis of Dyson, Kleban, and Susskind [31], the
real landscape has to contain vacua with nonpositive
cosmological constant. The price for alternative would
be a violation of both unitarity and ergodicity. Indeed,
the string theory landscape is expected to contain
valleys with negative cosmological constant as well as
supersymmetric regions with vanishing vacuum energy
[32]. The last ones are the seeds of an infrared divergence.
(2) It is possible that the finite lifespan of
metastable phases, once included into consideration,
might significantly alter our conclusions.
However, the estimates for a typical lifespan τ of
metastable vacua, made within a framework of the string
theory [32], [33], agree on τ ∼ e0.5×10
123
years. And
even though some models allow to lower this number
to e10
19
or even e10
9
years (the later is predicted by
the model containing the KPV instantons [34]), this can
hardly be called a satisfactory solution. (2.2) requires
from a vacuum with Λ = 0 to be abnormally short-
lived compared to all other vacua. However, it has been
shown in [33] that de Sitter minima are never stable.
After a series of tunneling events they eventually end in a
terminal vacua with exactly zero or negative cosmological
constant.
(3) The arguments based on the anthropic
reasoning might be deficient, requiring some additional
assumptions. This possibility will be explored in the
next chapter.
In this chapter, however, we will show that the
problems uncovered above doesn’t necessarily lead to
drastic changes in the anthropic reasoning or the visions
of cosmological multiverse. In fact, it appears that in
trying to interpret the zero probability for the observable
universe most of the cosmologists are making two
mistakes at once.
The first mistake is the wrong interpretation of zero
probabilities. Suppose a certain event A has a zero
probability: p(A) = 0. Does it mean that A cannot
happen? The answer is: not necessarily. Those events that
cannot happen are called impossible. The probability of
an impossible event is zero ad definition, but the opposite
is simply not true. The probability to hit a direct center
of a target is zero, but is not impossible. The probability
to guess number 42 out of all possible real numbers is
also zero, but it can happen nevertheless. And, finally,
the probability to find ourselves at one particular point
in infinitely large universe is also zero, yet we are here!
Getting back to our discussion, we have seen that,
according to Ellis and Smolin, an application of the
anthropic reasoning to a randomly chosen observer
results in a zero probability to find one in the universe
with a positive vacuum energy. However, such event
cannot be branded as impossible, and as such, the
difference between the Ellis and Smolin prediction and
the observational, as big as they are, by no means are
paradoxical.
Of course, this answer immediately rises another
5question: isn’t it true then that positiveness of the
cosmological constant in observable universe is an assured
proof of our atypicality? Because if the answer is yes, we
have neither right no any reason to use the anthropic
reasoning for any estimates we have used it for!
Fortunately for us, the answer to this question is no.
Our seeming atypicality is but an offspring of a second
mistake that is sadly characteristic of many articles on
the usage of anthropic principle in cosmology. The one
very clear and concise explanation of the mistake together
with the way to avoid it has been presented in the article
by Vilenkin and Garriga [7], which has also provided for
a solution of a Hartle an Hawking “human vs. jupiterian”
paradox [35]. The goal of this chapter is to show that
the reasonings of Vilenkin and Garriga remain applicable
even for the outcome whose probability is exactly zero.
It is actually easy to prove that the calculations of [7]
are still valid for infinite amount of “jupiterians” and, as
a consequence, the Vilenkin-Garriga method effectively
disposes of the infrared divergence problem. However,
such an approach ends up being extremely cumbersome
to manage. Instead, we will consider an Ellis and Smolin
problem, different from the one of Hartle and Srednicki,
and will show that the method of Vilenkin-Garriga does
good here as well.
To put it simply, the multiverse allows for two types
of conditional probabilities’ calculations. The first one is
called the prediction, the second one – explanation. The
difference between the probability distribution ascribed
to these different types of reasoning stems from the subtle
difference existing between the observers employing
them. According to Vilenkin and Garriga, only the
observers with similar informational content can be
assigned to the same equivalence class. Suppose we
don’t known the sign and value of Λ and are about to
conduct an experiment that will discern them for us. We
should understand that there is an infinite number of
observers living in the multiverse, who, while not being
similar to us, are in the same boat nevertheless and are
about to embark on the same astronomical endeavor
without knowing what it would yield. Assuming other
factors to be insignificant for our intents (we trace over
all information not correlated with the outcome of the
experiment) we conclude that altogether we belong to
class C(Λ =?). For the sake of simplicity, we’ll divide
all possible values of Λ into small intervals ∆Λi and
assume that the universe with Λ ∼ ∆Λi contains Ni
observers. This implies that the probability of observing
∆Λi is proportional to Ni. Next, suppose there exist such
a J that NJ ≫ Ni for all i 6= J . Then the majority of
observers would discover that Λ ∼ ∆ΛJ . But claiming
that they are the only type of observers possible would
just be absurd. After all, for every Λ ∼ ∆Λi there is
someone observing it!
Next, suppose the same multiversal cosmologists of
class C(Λ =?) has calculated a probability to find oneself
in a universe with Λ ∼ ∆Λ0 and it happen to be zero.
Since this is not an impossible observation, somebody
in a multiverse shall make it. What should be their
conclusion then? Should they deduce that the anthropic
reasonings and the very idea of the multiverse are plain
wrong? No. In order to interpret the observational results
via the Bayes theorem the observers would have to take
these very results into account, thus, they would have to
explain, not predict.
Suppose all members of class C(Λ =?) ponder the
two mutually exclusive theories. The first one is the
multiverse theory T (M), and it is its prediction that
there exist a multitude of universes with various values of
vacuum energy Λ. Theory T (S), on the contrary, insists
on existence of just one universe having a certain defined
Λ0, with neither sign nor value of Λ0 known to the
observers yet. Every member of the group utilizes his
or her information (the lack of it, to be certain) about
Λ0 for calculation of the likelihood measure of T (M)
and T (S) by the Bayes formula. Of course, being the
members of same group, they will come to exactly similar
probabilities: Prob(M) = Pr(M) и Prob(S) = Pr(S).
Let us also assume they all are also aware of the problem
of Ellis and Smolin (or their multiversal analogues).
Each one of them reasons that validity of theory T (M)
implies them existing in a universe with negative Λ with
100% certainty, because, after all, these are the universes
predominating the multiverse (compare N− = ∞ with
N+ <∞!). Now let us consider one particular astronomer
A. The Bayesian probabilities of theories T (M) and T (S)
as calculated by A under condition of her existence are
P (T (S)|A) =
Pr(S)
1 +N− +N+
, (3.1)
P (T (M)|A) =
Pr(M)(N− +N+)
1 +N− +N+
. (3.2)
Taking the limit N− = ∞ A gets P (T (S)|A) = 0
and P (T (M)|A) = Pr(M), which also means that
Pr(M) ∼ 1. In other words, it seems as if the theory
T (M) is a priory correct, no proof required. This, of
course, is wrong. The validity has to be checked through
the experiment. In order to do it A has to extract the
predictions from both theories and compare the results
with observations. The predictions regarding the vacuum
energy density are also made by the Bayesian formulas:
P (A see Λ > 0|T (M)) =
N+
N− +N+
→ 0 at N− →∞,
(3.3)
P (A see Λ < 0|T (M)) =
N−
N− +N+
→ 1 at N− →∞, .
(3.4)
Thus, it indeed looks like the probability to observe
the negative cosmological constant in framework of
T (M) theory should be equal to 1. So, it is very easy
to understand the embarrassment of A when the test
(performed by the multiversal analogues of COBE and
6WMAP) shows a seemingly impossible: that Λ = Λ0 > 0
(cf. (3.3), (3.4)). It would be hard for A to shake a feeling
that this result is nothing short of a stab in the back of
an anthropic reasoning and theory T (M) – just what
Ellis and Smolin claims it to be. Indeed, taking the limit
N− →∞, A arrives to formulas
P (A see Λ0 > 0|T (M)) = (N− +N+)
−1 → 0,
P (A see Λ0 > 0|T (S)) = 1,
(3.5)
and with the sad heart concludes that T (S) is valid, and
T (M) is not.
But A is wrong. The knowledge of Λ changes the
Bayesian formulas. The validity of T (M) should now be
calculated as:
P (T (M)|A;A seeΛ0) =
P (T (M)|A)PM
P (T (M)|A)PM + P (T (S)|A)PS
,
PM = P (A seeΛ0|T (M)),
PS = P (A see Λ0|T (S)).
(3.6)
Substituting (3.5), (3.1) and (3.2) into (3.6) results in
P (T (M)|A;A seeΛ0) =
Pr(M)
Pr(M) + Pr(S)
(3.7)
and
P (T (S)|A;A seeΛ0) =
Pr(S)
Pr(M) + Pr(S)
. (3.8)
Therefore, the conditional probabilities for theories T (M)
and T (S), as should be estimated by A after the
measurements of Λ will be proportional to initial validity
estimates Pr(M) and Pr(S):
P (T (M)|A;A seeΛ0) + P (T (S)|A;A seeΛ0) = 1, (3.9)
P (T (M)|A;A seeΛ0)
P (T (S)|A;A seeΛ0)
=
Pr(M)
Pr(S)
, (3.10)
in exact correspondence with [7].
IV. EXPONENTIAL RUNAWAY MEASURE
AND DOOMSDAY ARGUMENT VS. THE
INFRARED DIVERGENCE
The main intention behind the derivations of the
previous chapter was an a priori eradication of the
infrared divergence problem. Unfortunately, the method
has its flaws. The most troublesome one is the fact that
by resorting to such a method we leave, immediately
and quite voluntarily, the field of falsifiable hypotheses,
– i.e. the multiverse hypothesis appears to be virtually
unrefutable! – and this is most definitely not a kind of
outcome one can feel comfortable about. Moreover, by
accepting the explanatory limitations of the anthropic
reasoning, we are losing the most powerful tool in the
store of any physicist: the generation of viable predictions
fully testable via the experimental means. To sum it all
up, the choice before us is quite clear. If we are not put
off by the aforementioned limitations and are ready to
accept them, we would be able to terminate the infrared
divergence problem. If we are not, we’d have to invent
something else.
In our opinion, in order to set the anthropic
predictions right one should take a second look on the
Bayes probabilities. The article [7] has made it very
clear that the meaningful probabilistic estimates are
strongly connected to both the informational content
and the indexical information of the observers. Two
observers with identical observational data but different
indexical information would come to completely different
probabilistic estimates for the similar events. From this
point of view, it is rational to assume that the occurrence
of zero probabilities is but an artifact of our inability
to account for an indexical information. Of course, we
have no widely accepted criterions allowing us to make
a best pick of different approaches to such a task, but
then again, would it not be reasonable to choose exactly
those eradicating the infrared divergence?.. And, once
such a method would be found, one could start working
on its justification via the indexical information, and
not the other way around. This type of reasoning may
seem somewhat speculative, but it appears to be rather
promising. After all, it is not entirely new. The similar
argument has been introduced before as an attempt to
annulate the Boltzmann brain’s domination problem [36]
by restricting the attention only to those cosmological
measures that don’t allow for dominance of Boltzmann
brains over the classical ordered observers [37] – [40].
So, how should the probabilities be calculated?
According to our hypothesis, the probability to find
oneself in a universe with a given value of Λ should
include a conditional probability to perform an M0’s
observation, where the observations are being calculated
for the whole duration of the universe’s existence,
i.e. for 13.7 Gyr. The quantity M0 is not explicitly
known, of course, but it can be estimated by knowing
a contemporary increment of the matter’s entropy ∆S0
corresponding to a single observation [5]. In this context,
the Bayes formula changes from (1.1) to:
P (Λ|∆S0) ∼ P¯ (Λ)P (∆S0|Λ), (4.1)
where P (∆S0|Λ) is the conditional probability of
observation yielding a given cosmological value,
expressed as an entropy increment.
Remark 3. An alternative way of defining M0 would
be counting all stars inside of a Hubble volume with
regards to to their birth time, and assigning M0 to the
Sun’s corresponding number. However, the “entropy”
definition is still preferable as the one explicitly related
to a number of observation conveyed.
The (4.1) is intimately connected to the famous
Doomsday Argument [41] – [44]. The validity of this
7argument has been a subject of many fierce discussions.
Some researchers provide the sharp criticism of the
Doomsday Argument (cf. [45], [46]), while others strongly
argue in its defense (cf. [47], [48]). In fact, the authors of
this very article are also split in their opinions regarding
the Argument [62]. However, within the context of this
article we’ll accept it so it would be possible to apply
(4.1) for calculating the probability of observing a given
value of cosmological constant.
The first important thing would be defining an a
priori distribution P¯ (Λ). For this purpose we’ll make
use of the singular weighting function ω(Λ), recently
studied by Linde and Vanchurin [9]. This function leads
to the exponentially strong runaway regimes (e.g. the
Q-catastrophe [49]) and can be chosen in a number of
different fashions, say, as the Hawking measure ω
H
(Λ) ∼
exp(24π2/Λ) [50] or as the double exponential expression
in baby universe theory ω
BU
(Λ) ∼ exp(ω
H
(Λ)) [51].
However, the best choice for our purposes would be the
weighting function, obtained by counting the observable
universes [52]:
ω(Λ) ∼ exp
(
H3/2
I
|Λ|3/4
)
, (4.2)
where H
I
accounts for the Hubble constant at the end
of the slow-roll inflation. We’d like to point out that this
quantity is actually the estimate of the maximal number
of different locally distinguishable classical geometries.
Granted, all these measures contain an essential
singularity at Λ = 0 and are subject to infrared
divergence to even greater extent then the “regular”
measures (cf. [9]). Despite this, such “pathological”
measures might actually be of great interest to
cosmologists, because, being combined with the string
theory they might potentially lead to isolation of a single
vacuum state [9]! Bearing this prospect in mind Linde
and Vanchurin hypothesized that the allowed values of
Λ form a discrete spectrum that does not include point
Λ = 0. If this assumption is correct, any of the three
aforementioned measures can be used for calculation of
the average values. Unfortunately, no real reasons for
exclusion of Λ = 0 (besides the obvious fact that the
observable Λ IS positive) has been so far presented. Thus,
in our further considerations we’ll utilize the distribution
(4.2) for the role of P¯ (Λ) in (4.1) but will consider Λ
going through a continuous spectrum of values that also
includes the point Λ = 0. Then the probability:
P (Λ1 < Λ < Λ2|∆S0) =
∫ Λ2
Λ1
ω(Λ)P (∆S0|Λ)dΛ∫ Λmax
Λmin
ω(Λ)P (∆S0|Λ)dΛ
,
(4.3)
where the interval Λmin < Λ < Λmax defines the
anthropic bounds: Λmax is an upper Weinberg limit and
Λmin = −ρM0 , where ρM0 ∼ (10
−3 eV)4 is the present
density of matter.
Next, we shall figure out what P (∆S0|Λ) should look
like. As follows from [4], the dS universe allows for just
a finite number of observations, since at temperature
TdS ∼ Λ
−1/2 the entropy production ceases and the
entropy level stabilizes at SdS(Λ) = 24π
2/Λ. Next,
since the observer might exist in any of ω(Λ) universes
with a given Λ, the total entropy of multiverse should
be accounted for by taking a product of SdS(Λ) and
ω(Λ). By the Copernican Time Principle no preference
to any moment of time should exist, hence P (∆S0|Λ) =
∆S0/(ω(Λ)SdS(Λ)), i.e. the fraction of the matter’s
entropy produced by observers of a particular universe
to the total entropy amassed within the Multiverse by
the universes with the particular Λ. Substituting it into
(4.3) and taking the integrals one gets:
P (Λ1 < Λ < Λ2|∆S0) =
Λ22 − Λ
2
1
Λ2max − Λ
2
min
. (4.4)
If one assumes that Λ2−Λ1 = δΛ≪ Λ1, 2 and that δΛ is
fixed, one will find it very useful to utilize the probability
PδΛ(Λ > Λ1) with a fixed value Λ1. For two different
values Λ1 and Λ2 there exist a relationship:
PδΛ(Λ > Λ1)
PδΛ(Λ > Λ2)
=
Λ1
Λ2
,
in other words, we end up with a classical distribution
PδΛ(Λ > Λ1) ∼ Λ and with the probability density
ρδΛ(Λ > Λ1) = const. This quantity, (naively) used
as an a priory distribution, leads to all the well-known
results, including the well-fitting predictions regarding
the observable value of cosmological constant, free from
the infrared divergence problem.
V. CONCLUSION
The Λ problem has seen a lot of attention recently,
including the exotic views based on the alternative
cosmological models like the cosmologies with the
variable speeds of light [2] and brane world models
[1] (considerations of the last case made possible
via construction of exact solutions having small
cosmological constants, performed with the aid of
Darboux transformations [1], [54]). However, in this
article we develop what can be called an “anthropic
approach” instead. The article contains two main results:
A. It is shown that the zero probabilities pose no
threat to the multiverse models provided one uses not a
“predictory” but “explanatory” Bayes formulas.
B. It is shown that the infrared divergence problem
is avoidable in the scheme, utilizing the following
ingredients:
1. The probabilities are calculated according to the
Doomsday Argument algorithm;
2. The a priori probabilities are defined via the
exponential runaway Linde-Vanchurin measure (the
singular weighting function).
83. The total entropy of the multiverse should be
necessarily accounted for.
We’d like to conclude with two important remarks.
First, the Doomsday algorithm should only be
incorporated into the estimations of the cosmological
constant value, since it is this quantity that defines the
total entropy and is directly connected to the process of
observation. For other parameters the algorithm of [9]
should be used. In other words, the suggested method
doesn’t corrupt the main idea of Linde and Vanchurin
and allows to (i) dissolve the infrared divergence problem
and (ii) validate the well-known effective distributions,
that works so well for estimation of predicted Λ. Second,
we have utilized the Doomsday Argument which itself is
quite controversial in the eyes of many scientists. For this
article we did not intend to start a discussion regarding
all the “pros” and “cons” of the argument, but have merely
made use of it as a method, that ends up extremely
helpful in the cosmological measure theory and whose
faultiness (if it exists) has not been proven (yet?). This,
of course, doesn’t mean that the Doomsday Argument
IS correct. It merely means that if in the future the
Doomsday Argument would be substantiated with high
certainty, the phenomenological results of this article
would acquire a very strong backup, and so would be
the singular distributions of Linde-Vanchurin.
VI. APPENDIX. BEHIND THE SHADOW OF
COSMOLOGICAL CONSTANT
The underlying assumption behind every calculation
made in this article was that the peculiar behaviour of
observable universe is a direct manifestation of a non-zero
vacuum energy. While this assumption is accepted by a
majority of cosmologists, it is nevertheless possible that
the real explanation hides in a different venue of thought.
Among the different – and quite exotic – hypotheses
regarding this matter, there is a rather unusual one we
believe to be of particular interest. To be precise, it has
been suggested in articles [55], [56] that the observable
cosmological effects might be attributed to a very specific
dynamics of the universe, showing up on our readings as
an “effective” Λ, while in fact there might be no “real” Λ
involved at all.
For example, it is a known fact that some models
of modified gravity may mimic the universe with
(multiple, as a matter of fact) cosmological constants
(cf. [57]). In [55] the general scheme for modified
f(R)-gravity reconstruction from any realistic FRW
cosmology has been formulated, thus allowing to
formulate several versions of modified gravity where
the following sequence of cosmological epochs occurs:
matter dominated phase (with or without usual matter),
transition from decceleration to acceleration, accelerating
epoch consistent with recent WMAP data, FCDM
cosmology without cosmological constant. Such models
can be viewed as some evidence in favor of f(R)-gravity.
Quite different approach is given in [56]. Its idea
goes like this. First we are reminded that the standard
Einstein-Friedman equations for a flat universe might be
rewritten as:
ρ(t) =
3H(t)2
κ2
, p(t) = −
3H(t)2 + 2H ′(t)
κ2
, (6.1)
where p and ρ are pressure and density, κ2 = 8πG
and H(t) is the Hubble constant H(t) = a˙/a. This
system of differential equations is open and requires some
additional conditions to be solved successfully. Usually
the role of such a condition is played by an equation
of state, establishing the relationship between the ρ
and p. However, as follows from 6.1, it is possible to
define them independently, provided one knows the exact
form of function H(t). As an additional bonus, we can
immediately see that for any t0 such that H
′(t0) =
(dH/dt)t=t0 = 0 we get the relationship:
p(t0) = −ρ(t0),
which is characteristic of a universe filled with the
vacuum energy. In essence, the observer watching the
skies at t = t0 will be forced to conclude that his universe
contains the nonzero cosmological constant Λ = 3H2(t0).
Of course, there is no reason for a function H ′(t) to
have a single zero. Instead, it might contain a formidable
array of zeroes, each one of them corresponding to a
particular moment of time and to different observable
values of “vacuum energy”. We have therefore arrived to a
classical analogue of a “landscape”, where different space-
time regions of a universe correspond to different values
of “cosmological constant”.
Among those space-time patches there exist a few with
dynamics being critically similar to the one existing in the
de Sitter universe. But what should be the probability to
observe such a dynamics? The answer would depend on
the given form of function H(t). For example, for
H(t) = g(h(t)− sinh(t)),
with g and h being some differentiable functions, its
derivative turns to zero at t = tn, with h(tn) = 2πn
and n ∈ Z. The effective vacuum energy therefore takes
the values Λ = 3(g(2πn))2. Furthermore, the dynamics
is close to a de Sitter one in the δtn neighbourhood of
t = tn if the following relationship is satisfied:
∣∣∣∣∣ 2H˙3H2
∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣2g′(h(t)− sinh(t))(1 − cosh(t))h′(t)3(g(h(t)− sinh(t))2)
∣∣∣∣≪ 1.
(6.2)
Now, the fact that we do observe such a dynamics
in contemporary universe clearly leads to certain
restrictions imposed on functions g(t), h(t). The most
promising choice of function h(t) appears to be a function
possessing a horizontal asymptote. For example, function
9h(t) = 2πN tanh(ωt), where ω is an arbitrary constant,
approaches 2πN as t → 0, which means that the later
stages of the universe’s dynamics would be associated
with an effective vacuum energy Λ = 3g2(2πN) (which
can actually be equal to zero – hence, the smallness of
the “observable” cosmological constant!). Moreover, the
monotonicity of chosen h(t) implies that for N > 1 there
shall exist at leastN−1more zeroes of functionH(t) that
correspond to effective vacuum energies Λ = 3g2(2πn),
n < N . Therefore, we have a cosmic “landscape” with
a plethora of various values of observable “cosmological
constants”.
Of course, the question one shall ask here is whether
there exist a criterion for the functions like g, allowing to
derive them instead of simply contriving. This problem
might be somewhat simplified if one takes into account a
scalar field; the problem of choice of function H(t) then
reduces to a problem of appropriate scalar field potential.
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